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ABSTRACT
This article revisits previous surveys regarding value changes in Canada, Mexico,
and the United States. The earlier evaluation showed that a convergence of values
among these North American nations was occurring. This most recent study con-
firms that trend in several areas (though national and regional distinctions remain),
contradicting other predictions to the contrary. Whether one is afraid of change or is
eager for it, this study indicates that all three North American countries are, inevi-
tably, experiencing that change.
Key words: North American convergence, economic integration, culture, values, trade, conti-
nental integration
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INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the three co-authors jointly considered the question of whether value changes
in Mexico, the United States, and Canada were related and, further, whether the tra-
jectories of value change were in any way linked to greater economic integration.
We explored the findings from the second wave of the World Values Survey (WVS)
with respect to the region while the NAFTA discussions were starting.1 We analyzed
the trajectories shown by values from 1980 and 1990 (Inglehart, Basáñez and Nevitte,
1994; 1996), the only two points in time then available from the WVS. 
The predicted trajectories of value change in 1990 were based on Inglehart’s
framework of materialists and postmaterialists, using the 1980 data as a bench-
mark.2 The analysis also examined age cohorts to explore possible generational dif-
1 For simplicity’s sake, we refer to the five World Values Surveys (WVS) throughout this text as 1980, 1990,
1995, 2000, and 2005, although the exact dates in some countries may lag one or two years behind. Details
for the World Values Survey methodology, question wording, and full description can be found at In-
glehart, Basáñez, et al. (2004) or at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. We thank Roger Aleph Méndez for his
valuable assistance.
2 A massive body of evidence gathered from 1970 to the present demonstrates that an intergenerational
shift from materialist to postmaterialist priorities has been occurring in industrialized societies (Inglehart,
1971; 1977; 1990; 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Inglehart, 2008). The underlying theory is based on two
key hypotheses:
1. Virtually everyone wants freedom and autonomy, but people’s priorities reflect their socioeconomic
conditions: they tend to place the highest value on the most pressing needs. Material sustenance and
physical security are immediately linked with survival and, when they are scarce, people give top pri-
ority to these “materialistic” goals. But, under conditions of prosperity, people become more likely to
emphasize “postmaterialist” goals such as belonging, esteem, and esthetic and intellectual satisfaction.
2. To a large extent, one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s pre-adult years
and these values change, mainly through intergenerational population replacement. Although older
generations tend to transmit their values to their children, if one’s first-hand experience is inconsistent
with one’s cultural heritage, it can gradually erode. 
During the past several decades, most of the population of advanced industrial societies has not grown
up under conditions of hunger and economic insecurity. This has led to a gradual shift in which needs for
belonging, esteem and intellectual and self-expression have become more prominent. There is no one-to-
one relationship between socioeconomic development and the prevalence of postmaterialist values, for
one’s subjective sense of security is shaped by a society’s social welfare institutions as well as its mean
level of income. Furthermore, people’s basic value priorities do not change overnight: a society’s values
tend to change through intergenerational replacement.
More than three decades ago, Inglehart (1971) found dramatic age differences in the proportions of people
emphasizing materialist and postmaterialist values, respectively, among the populations of six Western coun-
tries. To measure these values, he asked people which goals they considered most important for their country,
choosing between such things as economic growth, fighting rising prices, maintaining order, the fight against
crime (which tap materialist priorities), and freedom of speech. These values emphasize giving people
more say in important government decisions, more say on the job, and a society where ideas count, which
tap postmaterialist priorities. Representative national surveys carried out in 1970 revealed huge differ-
ences between the values of young and old in all of these societies. Among those aged 65 and older, peo-
ple with materialist value priorities outnumbered those with postmaterialist value priorities by more than
12:1. But as one moved from older to younger cohorts, the balance gradually shifted toward a diminish-
ing proportion of materialists and a growing proportion of people with postmaterialist values. Among the
youngest cohort (those from 18 to 25 years old in 1970) postmaterialists outnumbered the materialists. 
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ferences. Two surprises emerged from that analysis. First, the predictions were right
in 31 out of 34 key variables we reviewed. Second, a pattern of values convergence
between the three countries was on course. 
This convergence finding contradicted Lipset’s continental divide thesis. More
surprising, it appeared that none of the countries were leading the convergence.
That original study was undertaken nearly two decades ago. All three countries
have, since, experienced NAFTA for over a decade. And there are also three new
measures of the WVS now available (1995; 2000 and 2005). Meanwhile, at least two
books were published contradicting our proposition (Samuel Huntington’s in the
U.S. and Michael Adam’s in Canada). With new data in hand, it is now timely to
revisit the basic question originally asked in 1990: has the NAFTA region convergence
continued, has it stabilized, or has it reversed?
THE ORIGINAL CONVERGENCE FINDINGS
The original 1990 exploration considered six areas of investigation: 1) Cultural, eco-
nomic, and political change in North America; 2) Changing patterns of world trade
and changing North American linkages; 3) Compatibility and change in the basic
values of North American people; 4) The erosion of institutional authority and the
rise of citizen intervention in politics; 5) A search for a new balance between state
and economy, individual and society; 6) Dissolving borders in North America.
That analysis demonstrated that a great deal of social, economic, and political
value change did take place in all three societies, and most of the changes conformed
to a predictable pattern. We found evidence of a systematic intergenerational shift,
and most of the changes that took place from 1980 to 1990 could actually be predicted
from patterns that were visible in the 1980 baseline data. A total of 31 variables shift-
ed in the predicted direction from 1980 to 1990. Using the same strategy, we are now
more confident to forecast further value changes that are likely to take place during
the coming decades.
Each country experienced a shift from materialist to postmaterialist orienta-
tions in each of the three populations and outlined the causes of that intergenera-
During the past 35 years, the predicted value shift occurred. In the early 1970s, materialists outnum-
bered postmaterialists by a 4:1 ratio in the six countries surveyed then. By 2006, postmaterialists had
become as numerous as materialists. Since 1970, these values have been measured in many additional
countries. For example, in the earliest U.S. survey, in 1972, materialists were three times as numerous as
postmaterialists; by 2006 there were 2.5 times as many postmaterialists as materialists in the U.S.
Materialist/postmaterialist values are closely linked with many other social values, which have tended to
move in the same direction as the shift toward postmaterialism.
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tional value shift. That shift had its origins in the formative experiences of the
younger generation throughout advanced industrial societies. The historically un-
precedented prosperity that has characterized Western societies since World War II,
together with the safety net provided by the welfare state in the past few decades,
had given rise to a situation in which a growing share of the public no longer gave
top priority to the quest for economic and physical security. Instead, there was
growing concern for the quality of life.
This shift in basic value priorities has far-reaching implications; they seem to
be linked with generational changes in prevailing motivations to work, in religious
outlook, sexual norms, and political goals. There was also evidence of a gradual
erosion of traditional nationalism and ethnocentrism, giving rise to an increasingly
cosmopolitan sense of identity. Further, these orientations shaped support for eco-
nomic and political integration among all three populations.
The major story emerging from that 1990 analysis was that the value systems
of the three North American societies were gradually shifting, and the direction of
value change was consistent with the broad transformations that were taking place
in most advanced industrial states. North Americans were on a common trajectory
of change moving toward: 1) free market economics; 2) democratic political insti-
tutions; and, 3) globalization. 
The United States, Canada and Mexico moved in the early 1990s toward con-
tinental free trade to avoid isolation in a world that was increasingly organized into
regional trading networks and to exploit the advantages that come from stable
access to large markets. In some respects, continental free trade might be viewed as
“window dressing”, a formal regularization of de facto economic integration that
had been welding the three economies together since the 1950s. But that perspec-
tive obscures the fact that comprehensive continental free trade represented a sub-
stantial policy shift for each of the three partners.
LIPSET, HUNTINGTON, ADAMS, ET AL.
To what extent do Americans, Canadians, and Mexicans share common values? Or,
more precisely, are the main values in each of these three countries compatible? The
weight of the historical evidence leads some to assume that they are not compati-
ble –and the gulf between the values of Mexican people, on one hand, and those
held by populations of the United States and Canada, on the other, appears to be
particularly wide. 
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In his celebrated analysis of American society, David Riesman (1950) argued
that individualism (emphasized as a distinctive U.S. trait by a long line of observers
going back to Alexis de Tocqueville) was disappearing. An inner-directed personali-
ty type was gradually being replaced by other-directed people. Another landmark
study of the 1950s, William Whyte’s (1956) The Organization Man, reached similar
conclusions: the Protestant ethic of hard work, thrift, and competition as the route
to individual salvation was giving way to a belief in belongingness as the ultimate
goal. Both Riesman and Whyte had grave misgivings about what they saw as the
decline of individualism in America.
This absence of a North American cultural consensus was not just a question
of the cleavage between Mexico and her two northern neighbors. Seymour Martin
Lipset, the foremost comparative analyst of the political cultures of the United
States and Canada, in a series of influential studies carried out over a period of
nearly three decades, argued that the United States and Canada experience a conti-
nental divide reflected in enduring differences in basic values and political styles
(Lipset, 1990). One influential historical explanation for North American cultural
variation, provided by Louis Hartz (1964), argued that each of the three new societies
were settled by very different founding peoples.
Scores of journalistic accounts, by contrast, described the 1980s in the United
States as a decade characterized by an explosion of individual greed and the abdi-
cation of collective responsibility. An insightful study by Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan,
Swidler, and Tipton (1985) concluded that the central problem of U.S. life was that
individualism had grown cancerous. They sought to rediscover cultural traditions
that could limit and restrain the destructive side of individualism. 
These diagnoses at first seem contradictory: do Americans have too little indi-
vidualism or too much? Examined more closely, however, they turn out to be com-
patible. They deal with different aspects of a complex change that is taking place in
the relationship between the individual and society, a process of change that is not
uniquely American, though it may be particularly acute there.
Two recent formulations that contradicted our convergence finding are supplied
by Michael Adams (2003) and Samuel Huntington (2004). Adams’s book, based on
values survey research, contains the main conclusion in its title: Fire and Ice: The U.S.,
Canada and the Myth of Converging Values. Huntington finds the huge Hispanic mi-
gration as a very serious threat to America’s national identity.
Adams is a knowledgeable and experienced commercial researcher with fre-
quent access to the electronic media. His book is aimed at a more general audience.
To be sure, there are elements of the Adams analysis that are supported by our data.
However, the convergence finding cannot be debunked on grounds of Canadians’
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popular vote. A detailed critique of the methods used to arrive at Adams’s diver-
gence conclusion is supplied by Smith (2005).
Huntington’s Who Are We? argues that the United States has been and, in many
ways, should remain a Christian, Anglo-centric country. That tradition, according
to Huntington, is currently threatened by migration’s multiculturalism (particular-
ly from Hispanic sources), imperiling the primacy of English language and culture.
Accordingly, Huntington challenges the wisdom of affirmative action, bilingual
education, and dual citizenship and fears that the U.S. foreign policy is dictated in
Mexico City. Unlike mainstream Canadian and Mexican analysis, Huntington lacks
confidence in the strength of U.S. culture. 
For Huntington, one core premise is that nationalism matters. As such, it is a
cultural argument: the defense of U.S. values such as individualism, the work ethic,
achievement orientation, morality, and the like. The existing evidence about Hispanic
assimilation, however, simply does not support Huntington’s fears. 
But what of the demographic ancestry of the U.S. population? Huntington
departs from the assumption that the American core is an Anglo-Protestant legacy
derived from England. However, the largest single demographic contribution to
today’s U.S. population is Germany, not England or Ireland (Statistical Abstract of
the U.S.; 2007: table 50). Americans recognize their ancestors as German (48 million),
Irish (34 million), English (28 million), and Italian (16 million), among the largest
groups. Is it the perception of cultural similarities or of a beneficial influence from
Germans that prevent criticisms and resistance to such blending in the United
States? The implication is that the Hispanic culture is different and/or harmful, hence
the criticisms and resistance. 
These decades’ worth of experience with NAFTA and the emergence of alterna-
tive perspectives in the intervening years since the original study make it worth-
while to reconsider with more recent data. With 25 years of data in hand, what is
the trajectory of value change in the three countries? Are values becoming closer, as
predicted, or are they growing further apart? To answer these questions, we look at
the distribution of the three countries on Inglehart’s values map (Inglehart, 1997:
93). This analysis was not available in 1990 but it offers a coherent and synthetic
way to look at the overall trajectory, taken over time, by the three countries. 
MATERIALIST AND POSTMATERIALIST VALUES IN NORTH AMERICA (1980-2005)
One of the most powerful predictors of change emerging in that 1990 analysis cen-
tered around Inglehart’s (1971) materialist–postmaterialist theory. A key element
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associated with this theory is that the proportion of materialists and postmaterial-
ists in a single country is influenced by the reality and perception of the internal
safety and the economic performance of their country. Hence, the balance between
these two polar groups is dynamic –i.e. it increases and decreases over time. The
correlation found between these values and the inverted inflation rate is striking
(Inglehart, 1990: 94).
As the data show, there is evidence of a dynamic divide of the materialist–post-
materialist variety in the NAFTA region. The proportion of change of these two polar
segments of the population over time in the three countries shows a very different
pattern. The mixed segment is omitted from the graph, as it is the remnant percent
and has remained constant around 60 percent. 
Canada is clearly the most postmaterialist of the three countries (28 percent),
whereas Mexico (20 percent) is slightly above the U.S. (18 percent). However, most
important is the gap between postmaterialists and materialists that, in Canada,
amounts to a ratio of nearly 3 to 1, whereas Mexico and the U.S. are nearly in bal-
ance: 1 to 1. 
However, it is clear that the proportion of materialists in Canada and the U.S.
declined, substantially, between 1980 and 2000 and, then, the trajectory reversed:
slightly in Canada (9 to 10 percent) and sharply in the U.S. (10 to 21 percent). Is this
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one effect of 9/11? It consequently also impacted the otherwise rising trajectory of
postmaterialists: slightly in Canada (29 to 28 percent) and sharper in the U.S. (25 to
18 percent). The rising pattern of post-materialism in Mexico seems steadier, with a
minor drop in 2000 (17 to 15 percent). 
NORTH AMERICA TRAJECTORIES ON INGLEHART’S WORLD VALUES MAP
Inglehart’s global values synthesis is a very valuable tool because it enables the
analysis not only of positions but of trajectories. It allows for the analysis of such
demographic factors as generational change while, also, explaining the effects of
such structural factors as education, urbanization, jobs moving into the service sec-
tor, and others, encapsulated in the materialist–postmaterialist dimension. 
According to that approach, it appears that the patterns of change in the NAFTA
region are more complex. Notice that between 1981 and 2006, the three countries
move in a similar trajectory on the horizontal axis (economic-social) of Inglehart’s
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value map but they diverge on the vertical axis (political-cultural). In other words,
the three countries are becoming more economically developed –hence the dis-
placement to the right side of the map. They all embrace more self-expression val-
ues. However, Canada is becoming more secular, whereas Mexico became less
secular and went back to more traditional values. It is possible that in Mexico and,
to some extent also in the U.S., the political-cultural divergence might be attributa-
ble to the emergence of greater income inequality. 
After reviewing the extent of convergence and divergence across the nearly 300
variables included in the WVS, as well as the trajectories shown by the three coun-
tries on the Inglehart’s world values map (shown in Figure 2), the conclusion is that
the NAFTA region is not diverging as Huntington and Adams propose. But nor is it
only converging. As he did almost two decades ago, Moreno (2005: 49) has present-
ed a detailed review of the trajectory of Mexico in the world values map during
this period and shows how Mexico moved from 1980 to 1990 in the same pattern as
Canada shows and then Mexico’s trajectory broke to head south of the chart.
Furthermore, Nevitte’s analysis of Canadian values shifts (Nevitte, 1996) reports
complementary changes.
The following paragraphs introduce new data and the exploration is struc-
tured in five segments: 1) Views toward a NAFTA union; 2) Economic values and atti-
tudes; 3) Political values and attitudes; 4) Family values; and 5) Personal values. 
PART ONE: TOWARD A NAFTA UNION?
World Trade Flows
The assumption, widely shared by classic integration theory, is that interaction pro-
motes similarities in values which, in turn, lead to higher levels of mutual trust
(Deutsch, 1969). How, then, have trade flows in the world changed since 1989?
According to the data in Figure 3, total trade in 1989 was US$3 128 billion and,
in 2004, it was US$8 745 billion, an increase of 279 percent in 15 years. Although the
NAFTA countries represent a larger gross product and population than Europe, in
terms of intra-trade Europe is, nevertheless, four times stronger than the NAFTA
region (US$2 973 billion versus US$742 billion), basically the same ratio shown in
1989 (US$660 billion versus US$165 billion). 
Notice that NAFTA, Europe and Asia intra-trade grew in the 15-year period
(4.49, 4.45 and 4.00 times, respectively) at the expense of the decline of the rest of
the world’s intra-trade. NAFTA shows barely the largest expansion of all regions, as
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it formally started in 1994. Otherwise, it would show a much lower level than the
current one. However, if total trade is taken into account (i.e. imports, exports and
intra-trade), NAFTA does not show a very promising picture: Europe is getting 46
percent of the world’s total trade share, Asia 25 percent, NAFTA a modest 18 percent
and the rest of the world 11 percent. Have these shifting patterns of trade been
accompanied by shifts in the identities of citizens within the NAFTA countries?
Economic competition is the engine behind the formation of regional trade
blocks. Lagging behind in the race makes a region weaker and more vulnerable.
There should be no higher priority than reducing the gap between Mexico and the rest
of NAFTA, to unleash the consumer power of 70 million more Mexicans. The estab-
lishment of the NAFTA fund proposed by Pastor that would invest US$200 billion for
infrastructure should be included on the trilateral agenda (Pastor, this issue).
Belonging to Geographical Units
Since 1980, the WVS has asked: “To which of these geographical groups would you
say you belong, first of all: 1) The locality or town where you live; 2) The region of
the country in which you live; 3) Your country as a whole; 4) North America as a
whole; 5) The world as a whole?” The changes in 25 years are impressive and they
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WORLD TRADE FLOW, 1989 AND 2004 (BILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)
Source: World Trade Organization, World Trade Statistics 2005, Statistical Appendix, Table A2, p. 194.
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show a consistent pattern: in all three countries, there was a substantial shift from
emphasis on the town or region in which one lives toward broader geographical
units. We observe a pervasive shift from a parochial to a more cosmopolitan focus
of identity but national identities have not been abandoned. 
In 1980, 8 out of 10 people in Mexico and the U.S. and nearly 7 out of 10 in
Canada felt they belonged to the town or region in which they lived. By 2005, iden-
tification with the parochial option had eroded considerably. Canadian erosion is
weaker but parallels her NAFTA partners. From a ratio of 8-to-2 and 7-to-3 in favor
of the more local choice, the three countries have moved to a near balance of 1-to-1
with the larger geographical groups.
This is not an isolated finding. It seems to be part of a broader shift from a
parochial sense of identity toward an increasingly cosmopolitan outlook, which is
very important given an increasingly global world. Here again, these changes were
predicted by our model. 
If there is, indeed, a secular trend away from relatively parochial outlooks toward
a sense of belonging to broader geographic units, this bodes well for a potential
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North American political community or, even, broader forms of integration. We
should not over-interpret the data, however. In all three countries, the trend seems
to be moving toward a more cosmopolitan sense of identity. But these changes are
occurring gradually. 
Feelings of Trust among North American People
As the Figure 5 shows, the feeling of trust that is essential for healthy business and
social relations has improved between the three countries. A majority of Canadians,
in 1990 (55 percent), trusted Americans and that percent increased over the 15-year
period to 63 percent.
The changes among Mexicans follow the same trajectory as among Canadians.
The sentiment in Mexico, in 1990, clearly was of distrust (52 percent) but, now, dis-
trust has dropped to 31 percent. This same question in the U.S. was not repeated by
the WVS after 1990. However, according to the most recent data, 64 percent of Amer-
icans trusted Canadians and 52 percent trusted Mexicans. 
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National Pride 
In 1980, 76 percent of the U.S. public said that they were “very proud” to be Amer-
icans: these levels of national pride were significantly higher than among Canadians
(62 percent) or Mexicans (65 percent). But significant changes have taken place.
Most recent data show that American levels of national pride have dropped to 66
percent, similar to those of Canadians (69 percent). Mexicans show the highest lev-
els of pride (83 percent). But even more interesting is the pattern of change shown
in the region. The Mexicans’ impressive rise, after 1990, may reflect the enthusiasm
for democracy that awoke within society after the massive mobilization by the
political opposition during the presidential campaign of 1988. Its subsequent elec-
toral victories at local and state levels reinforced the trend until the opposition won
the presidency in 2000. All these events in Mexico led to a sense of an expansion of
liberty (Moreno, 2005: 62).
Canadian Mexican American
1980 1990 2000 2005 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
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Doing Away with Borders
To examine variations in public enthusiasm for continental political integration, the
WVS asked the three populations a very direct and simple bottom-line question: “All
things considered, do you think we should do away with the border between the
United States and Canada/Mexico?” This question goes far beyond any proposal
currently being discussed by the governments of these countries. But the levels of
support for political union are much higher than a projection based on past history
would predict, especially in Canada and Mexico. 
About one in five Canadians (22 percent) and Americans (18 percent) favor
abolishing the border with their southern neighbor. And nearly half of all American
respondents (42 percent) and Mexicans (51 percent) support doing away with their
northern neighbor’s border. The question about the Mexican border was not asked
in the U.S. in 1990 but it was included in 2000 and shows a quite similar level to
Canadians’ responses about the border with the U.S.
While levels of support for political integration have declined somewhat
among Americans and Canadians, Mexicans’ readiness to consider that option has
increased from 25 percent to 51 percent. One possible explanation for the Mexican
change is the steep increase of migration to the U.S. in the last 25 years. That
increase has been propelled by vast unemployment and the income per capita stag-
nation in real terms since 1982. 
U.S. with Canada Canada with U.S. Mexico with U.S. U.S. with Mexico
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ABOLISHING NAFTA BORDERS (PERCENT IN FAVOR)  
Source: 1990, 2000, and 2005 World Values Survey.
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Forming One Country
Another direct and bottom-line question aimed to test support for integration under
different scenarios is: “Would you favor or oppose having Canada/Mexico and the
United States form one country, if ‘it meant that you would enjoy a higher standard
of living/it means losing this country’s cultural identity/it meant that we could
deal more effectively with environment issues like acid rain and air pollution/it
meant that Canada would form 12 new states in the United States/it meant slight-
ly lower taxes but fewer government services/it meant a better quality of life?’”
As Table 1 shows, one scenario clearly decreases support for political union in
all three populations: the scenario that relates to culture. But on that count, the
effects are the weakest for the U.S. Concerns for national cultural identity underpin
both the Canadian and Mexican publics’ opposition to the idea of continental polit-
ical union. In a way, it is a similar argument to that of Huntington: fear of a culture
weakening. A comparison of how publics react to the higher standard of living and
cultural identity scenarios once more graphically illustrates the fundamental dilem-
mas between the trade-offs of achieving economic gains and the threat posed to col-
lective values that political union implies.
The very high levels of support for political union, evident in 1990, have now
declined to more moderate levels. However, notably, in 2000 a majority of Americans
Table 1
FORMING ONE COUNTRY (PERCENT IN FAVOR)
U.S. Canada Mexico
with Canada with U.S. with U.S.
Survey Year 1990 - 2000 1990 - 2005 1990 - 2005
Better quality of life 81 - 77 50 – 41 64 – 53
Environmental issues 79 - 66 56 – 41 53 – NA
Higher std. of living 72 - 59 38 – 27 61 – 49
Public/private health care 67 - NA 12 – NA 51 – NA
12 /32 new states 60 - 37 18 – 11 24 – 25
Less tax/services* 45 - 34 17 – 12 37 – 18
Cultural identity 43 - 10 11 – 5 16 – 12
* The 1990 question in Mexico was “more taxes but better services.”
NA: Not Available
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were favoring a union when it came to quality of life (77 percent), environment (66
percent), or standard of living (59 percent). Meanwhile, 53 percent of Mexicans also
favor it if quality of life improves, while Canadians do not. In 1990, 43 percent of
Americans were in favor of forming one country with Canada, even if cultural iden-
tity were at risk. By 2000, that percentage shrank to 10 percent. 
PART TWO: ECONOMIC VALUES AND ATTITUDES
Who Should Run Business in North America
The ongoing cultural shift does not easily fit into conventional models of left and
right. Though we find evidence of a deep-rooted trend away from the Marxist
model for society, it is not simply a move back to orthodox capitalism. Figure 8
illustrates this aspect of what is happening. From 1980 to 1995, support for employ-
ee participation in management of business and industry rose significantly among
both the Canadian and U.S. populations. In Mexico, on the other hand, where post-
materialism was not linked with employee participation, support for this option
declined. This reversal of patterns between what happened in Mexico and what
happened in her two Northern neighbors is a further reflection of fundamental dif-
ferences in the historic situations of the respective countries. 
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WHO SHOULD RUN BUSINESS IN NORTH AMERICA
Contrasting changes are taking place in Mexico, on the one hand, and the United
States and Canada, on the other, but the net result has been to make the prevailing
economic ideology in these countries more similar. Starting from a tradition that
combined a strong, highly centralized state with widespread suspicion of individ-
ual entrepreneurs, the Mexican public has been moving toward growing accept-
ance of classic capitalist principles. Starting with strongly pro-capitalist traditions,
the people of the United States and Canada continue to reject state ownership and
control but are moving toward a more egalitarian version of private enterprise. 
Attitudes toward Authority 
Orientations toward authority are fundamental to economic, social, and political
relationships, and WVS evidence from 1980 and 1990 surveys show that profound
changes and a shift toward egalitarian outlooks are taking place in nearly all soci-
eties for which we have data (Nevitte, 1996). 
The responses to a question about whether one should follow the instructions
of one’s superiors at work, even if one does not agree with them, are very illuminat-
ing. In all three countries, the young are less likely to support this idea than are the
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SHOULD PEOPLE FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS AT WORK? (PERCENT WHO AGREED)
old. It is not difficult to offer an explanation for this finding. It could be based on life
cycle effects: the young are less likely to be in positions of authority so they are less
likely to endorse it than are the old. But it would be equally plausible to see this pat-
tern as reflecting a historic decline in emphasis on unquestioning obedience to
authority, linked with rising educational levels, changes in the nature of work, and
intergenerational value shifts that place greater emphasis on individual autonomy.
In both the United States and Canada, the age-related differences are paralleled
by a consistent set of repeatedly encountered value differences, in which postmate-
rialists contrast with materialists in the same way that the young contrast with the
old. But here again, Mexico does not conform to the pattern: though we find dif-
ferences across age groups that are similar to those found in the U.S. and Canada,
there is no evidence of a parallel decline in emphasis on authority across the three
value types.
Once again, the changes that took place concerning following instructions at
work after 1980 reveal a shift in the direction that the intergenerational change
model predicts, among both the U.S. and Canadian publics –and a shift in the reverse
direction in Mexico pointing to the convergence, as Figure 9 shows. Starting from a
considerably lower base than their northern neighbors, the Mexican public became
more supportive of following the instructions of one’s superiors in the workplace.
Note that this trend applies specifically to following instructions at work. The Mex-
icans are not becoming more authoritarian in general: the overall trend is in the
opposite direction. But acceptance of entrepreneurial authority has been growing.
Even after this shift, Mexicans remain less committed to following instructions than
Americans, but they have moved toward acceptance of traditional capitalist norms
at the same level as Canadians. 
PART THREE: POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES
Confidence in Governmental Institutions 
Figure 10 shows the percentages of respondents who expressed “a great deal” of
confidence in each of the following groups in their country: 1) the armed forces;
2) the police; 3) parliament (or Congress); and 4) the civil service. The American pub-
lic expresses higher levels of confidence in their armed forces than do Mexican and
Canadians. Also, Canadians are more confident in their police than Americans, where-
as Mexicans show very little confidence in police. The civil service and Con-
gress/Parliament in the three countries are at their lowest levels. Ratings of these
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four groups tend to go together in all three countries and it seems to continue to be the
case, with the exception of the armed forces (Dalton, 1996; Kaase and Newton, 1995). 
Like other shifts, these differences seem to be a symptom of a generational
change. Postmaterialists tend to register lower levels of confidence in these institutions
than do materialists. These findings are consistent with our argument that a sense of
insecurity tends to motivate support for strong institutions and for strong political
authority in particular. Having experienced a relatively high sense of economic and
physical security throughout their formative years, postmaterialists are less inclined
than materialists to support the idea of strong centralized authority relations.
The familiar conjunction of age-related differences, together with value-related
differences, points to the possibility of a shift over time toward the outlook of the
younger and more postmaterialist respondents. In all three countries, confidence in
government institutions in 2005 was lower than in 1980. The single exception is the
case of the armed forces. 
Confidence in Non-Governmental Institutions 
The data tell a similar story concerning confidence in non-governmental institu-
tions. The rating of churches, press, private companies, unions, and TV reflects anoth-
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Figure 10
A GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE IN… 
er cluster of empirically-related responses. Again, in all three countries, the young
express lower levels of confidence in these institutions than the old and postmate-
rialists exhibit lower levels of confidence than materialists.
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A GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE IN CHURCH 
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A GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE IN… 
These two related charts are plotted apart because the scale for church is too
high to compare with the other variables, at very modest levels. 
Once again, we found the symptoms of an intergenerational shift that seems to
reflect the higher levels of economic and physical security that shaped the forma-
tive years of the younger cohorts. Also, once again, we found that the 1980 data
enabled us to predict the changes that took place the following decade. In both the
United States and Canada, confidence in all non-governmental institutions declined,
including the church, as Figures 11 and 12 demonstrate.
One important reason that may be influencing the decline in “church confi-
dence” is the cases of pederast priests that received a great deal of public attention
in recent years. The Mexican data show little change in “church confidence” from
1980 to 1995 and a recovery in 2000, but the decline continued in 2005. Figures 11
and 12 provide a detailed breakdown of how ratings of each of the non-govern-
mental institutions changed over time in the three countries. 
Conventional Participation
Inglehart (1990) followed given cohorts over a period of nearly two decades and
confirmed the interpretation that the youngest cohort virtually always shows lower
levels of voting turnout and political interest than the next older group, generally
those in their 30s. The low politicization of the young clearly does reflect a life-cycle
phenomenon. Furthermore, the very oldest groups also showed relatively low rates
of conventional participation. The young were less politicized because they were
not yet fully integrated into political life but the old showed lower rates of partici-
pation because they had lower educational levels than younger cohorts.
Figure 13 shows the percentages at which the three North American publics
engage in three closely correlated forms of behavior: 1) discussing politics; 2) being
interested in politics; and, 3) having signed a political petition. Using age and post-
materialism as prediction tools, the hypothesis we presented in 1990 was that this
trend would continue to rise. 
As we have stated, this pattern reflects the fact that postmaterialists consist of
those who have been raised under conditions of relative economic and physical
security. They tend to take immediate survival needs for granted and have more
time and energy to spend on more remote and abstract activities, such as politics.
Here, the younger groups do not show higher levels of conventional political par-
ticipation than the older groups: we attribute this trend to life-cycle effects that
suppress evidence of an underlying generational change. Postmaterialists, how-
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ever, do show relatively high levels of participation. The fact that postmaterialist
values are linked with higher rates of conventional political activity should rein-
force the trend by which higher educational levels tend to produce a gradually ris-
ing potential for mass political participation.
How do we explain the well-known phenomenon of declining rates of voter
turnout in the light of these findings? Here, there seem to be two distinct and seem-
ingly contradictory trends. Despite the fact that the younger, better educated birth
cohorts show higher political discussion rates than do their elders, they have lower
levels of political partisan loyalty. The younger cohorts are better educated and
more apt to be interested in politics, to discuss politics, and to sign petitions, but
they are distinctly less likely to have a sense of party loyalty.
Unconventional Participation 
Do these patterns of conventional participation also apply to unconventional par-
ticipation? The WVS contains a battery of questions concerning one’s readiness to
take part in four forms of unconventional political action: boycotts, demonstrations,
unofficial strikes, and building take-overs. 
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CONVENTIONAL PARTICIPATION 
In all three countries, the data show that younger respondents are much read-
ier to engage in unconventional political action than older ones. The differences between
younger and older cohorts are striking: the young group is at least three times as
likely to engage in unconventional political action as the oldest group. We also
found strong correlations between unconventional political action potential and mate-
rialist–postmaterialist values. Do the changes over time confirm this interpretation?
As Figure 14 shows, the answer is “yes” for Canada and the U.S., but the pat-
terns for Mexico are mixed. We found significant increases in mass potential for
unconventional participation in the U.S. and Canada. Although the increase was
impressive in both the United States and Canada, in 1990, it was truly remarkable
in Mexico, which rose from a position far behind both of her northern neighbors in
1980, to ranking in 1990 almost as high as they did and, then, back, again, in 2000,
to rise once more in 2005. 
The Mexican phenomenon seems linked with the surge of political activism
that increasingly called into question the one-party domination of Mexican politics
by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) until its defeat in 2000. Thereafter, a
sort of disenchantment about the possibilities of democracy occurred. The Mexican
public increasingly became involved in both conventional and unconventional
action during the 1990s but withdrew thereafter.
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UNCONVENTIONAL PARTICIPATION 
Greater Respect for Authority
In all five waves, representative national samples of the Mexican, Canadian and U.S.
publics were told: “I’m going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life
that might take place in the future. Please, tell me, for each one, if it were to hap-
pen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don’t you mind?”
One of the possible changes mentioned was “greater respect for authority.”
In all three countries, in 1980, the young were less likely than the old to say that
greater respect for authority would be a good thing. The difference across age groups
was relatively small in Mexico and quite steep in Canada. By itself, this does not
prove anything about intergenerational change: one can easily imagine explana-
tions for this pattern that would be based on a life-cycle interpretation. The old are
likelier than the young to be in positions of authority and, so, to be oriented more
favorably toward it. 
Most members of the oldest group (those 65 to 85 years of age at the time of the
survey) are less likely to be in positions of authority, yet they are, on the whole,
the ones who are most favorable to greater respect for authority. With WVS data, it
is possible to test the two competing interpretations. We found that, in all three
countries, the postmaterialists are less likely to endorse greater respect for authori-
ty than are materialists. Again, the relationship is of modest strength in Mexico but
quite pronounced in Canada, with the United States falling in between.
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GREATER RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY (%)
Once again, our two sets of indicators give converging signals with the young
differing from the old in the same direction that the postmaterialists differ from the
materialists. This finding suggests a process of intergenerational value change and
predicts that support for greater respect for authority should gradually decline. Do the
data support or reject this hypothesis?
As Figure 15 illustrates, the answer is both. In the U.S., there was much less
emphasis on authority in 2005 than in 1980, as well as some decline in Canada. But
in Mexico, which also showed the weakest linkages with age group and value type
in 1980, the decline is relatively modest from 1980 to 1995, and then, a sharp and
counter-intuitive increase occurs. One possible explanation may lie in the enthusi-
asm that the democratization process unleashed during the 1990s. The step-by-step
victory of the opposition parties at the municipal, state and –finally, in 2000– nation-
al elections may have produced an increase in respect for authority. 
PART FOUR: FAMILY VALUES
The analysis so far has focused on economic and political outlooks. Is there evi-
dence of similar patterns of change when it comes to primary relations?
Children’s Qualities
The WVS asked respondents what values people consider important in child rearing.
Our respondents were told: “Here’s a list of qualities which children can be encour-
aged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?
Please, choose up to five.”
They were shown a list of 10 qualities, ranging from “obedience” to “unselfish-
ness.” Among these 10 items, five are of particular interest. It turns out that people
tend to emphasize either the goals of “independence,” “imagination,” and “determina-
tion” or the goals of “obedience” and “religious faith.”  Those who choose one item in
the first group are likely to emphasize the other items in that group as well, but they
are not likely to emphasize “obedience” or “religious faith.”  Values like “independ-
ence,” “imagination,” and “determination” reflect the priority of encouraging a child
to think for themselves. Those who choose “obedience” and “religious faith” value
conformity to established authority and respect for established social norms. 
In all three countries, according to the WVS data, the younger cohorts tend to
emphasize autonomy more strongly than do the older groups. Longitudinal research
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carried out in the United States has demonstrated that, between the 1950s and the
1980s, the American public’s emphasis on conformity to authority in childrearing
gradually declined and there was a corresponding rise in emphasis on “autonomy”
(Alwin, 1986). An emphasis on independence, imagination, and determination seems
to be linked with postmaterialist values. Because we know that there has been an
intergenerational shift from materialist to postmaterialist values, this fact, too, sug-
gests that a related shift may be taking place in childrearing values.
Shifts in the relative emphasis on independence, imagination, and determina-
tion took place in all three countries between 1980 and 2000: all three populations
moving in the direction predicted by the correlations with age and postmaterial-
ist values. In both the United States and Canada, emphasis on the three “autonomy”
values showed a substantial jump during the first decade. But the change that took
place in Mexico was even more dramatic. In 1980, the Mexicans were less than half
as likely to emphasize autonomy values as were their North American neighbors.
By 1990, they had almost caught up to other North Americans. However, the trend
seems to have reversed: during the 1990s in Mexico and, after 2000 in the U.S. and
Canada. None reverted to the 1980’s level but a reversal did occur.
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CHILDREN’S QUALITIES (%)
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Family Duty
Clear and readily interpretable patterns do not emerge for all dimensions. One
apparent and striking exception concerns the ties between parents and children:
whether a child needs both a father and a mother, whether a woman needs children
in order to be fulfilled, and parents’ duties toward their children. In both the United
States and Canada, there was an increase, rather than a decrease, in emphasis on
family duty from 1980 to 1990. The rise is modest in both countries but it runs count-
er to the trends that would be predicted by most of the earlier evidence. Only the
Mexican public moved in the expected direction, from 1980 to 1990, with a sizeable
decline in emphasis on family duties.
The pattern here is complex. In contrast with the consistent pattern found with
most age-related variables, the increase, over time, did not move in the same direc-
tion as the trend across age groups, at least not in the United States and Canada.
The observed anomalies are small. Both the rise in an emphasis on family duty that
we find from 1980 to 1990 for the U.S. and Canada and the reversal in the age pat-
tern for those two countries are small enough that either –or both– could be attrib-
utable to sampling error. But they are also consistent with the interpretation that for
several decades the prevailing trend has been toward declining emphasis on fami-
ly values. It appears, however, that this trend is now leveling off and may be revers-
ing itself. De-emphasis on the family may have reached a floor: the nuclear family
may still have a vital function to fulfill.
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FAMILY DUTIES
From the economic vantage point, the advantages of a large family unit have
undoubtedly become less crucial. But there are certain psychological functions
which the family unit fulfills and which no other institution seems to be able to ful-
fill equally well. Whether the reversal of expectations represents a turning point in the
decline of family ties is too difficult to determine in the absence of more data. But
the possibility stands as an intriguing one. 
Sexual Permissiveness
Two main reasons are usually offered to explain the decline of traditional religious
social and sexual norms in advanced industrial societies. The first is that an increas-
ing sense of security brings a diminishing need for absolute norms. Individuals
under high stress need rigid, predictable rules. They need to be sure of what is
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Table 3
FAMILY DUTIES
Children Women Always Parents
need need respect duty to 
Parents chidren parents do best
Canada
1980 66 26 70 73
1990 78 24 69 76
2000 71 19 79 81
2005 61 17 NA* NA
Mexico
1980 91 54 88 88
1990 88 52 78 82
1990 76 45 80 67
2000 86 43 90 80
2005 83 NA NA NA
U.S.
1980 63 18 74 77
1990 74 21 74 82
1990 76 18 78 84
2000 64 15 77 85
2005 64 NA NA NA
* Not available.
going to happen because their margin for error is slender and the consequences of
an unexpected turn of events could be fatal. 
The second reason is that societal and religious norms usually have a function.
Such basic norms as “Thou shalt not kill” help restrict violence to narrow, pre-
dictable channels. Without such norms, a society would tend to tear itself apart.
Many religious norms such as “Thou shalt not commit adultery” or “Honor thy father
and mother” are linked with maintaining the family unit. As long as divorce threat-
ens its children’s survival, society is apt to view divorce as intolerable. These par-
ticular functions, however, have become less crucial than they once were. 
As Figure 18 and Table 4 show, disapproval of homosexuality, prostitution, abor-
tion, and divorce have all declined in the three countries during this period. By 1980,
Mexico showed the highest disapproval levels, followed by the U.S., while Canada
was already quite permissive. By 2005, the majority of all three populations were
found to approve these behaviors. The only exception concerns abortion in Mexico.
In contrast, throughout the whole 25-year period, attitudes toward divorce have
been the most permissive of all, despite the clear objection of the Catholic Church. 
50
MIGUEL BASAÑEZ, RONALD INGLEHART, NEIL NEVITTE
NORTEAMÉRICA
1980 1990 2000  2005         1980 1990 1995  2000 2005         1980 1990  1995 2000  2005
Canada                             Mexico                               U.S .
75%
65%
55%
45%
35%
25%
15%
5%
Homosexual i ty           Prost i tut ion          Abor t ion            Divorce
Figure 18
SEXUAL PERMISSIVENESS (PERCENT WHO SAID “NEVER JUSTIFIED”)
PART FIVE: PERSONAL VALUES
Meaning and Purpose of Life 
Historically, religion provided answers to such questions as: “Where are we going?”
“Where do we come from?” or “Why are we here?” In modern times, people increas-
ingly turned to the physical sciences or to ideologies such as Marxism for answers
to these questions. Today, the shift toward postmaterialist values brings a growing
concern for the meaning and purpose of life.
Postmaterialists are less likely to hold traditional religious beliefs than are
those with mixed or materialist values, but they are more likely to emphasize “reli-
gious seeking” (Kojetin, 1988). The World Values Survey data confirms this inter-
pretation. In each nation, our respondents were asked: ”How often, if at all, do you
think about the meaning and purpose of life?” The responses are related to value
types in the three North American countries.
Postmaterialists are less likely than materialists to state that they believe in God
in virtually every society for which we have data. But they are significantly more like-
ly to state that they spend time thinking about the meaning and purpose of life. This
finding holds true despite the fact that older people are more religious than their
younger counterparts. It seems likely that this trend reflects a life cycle effect: the old
are more apt to spend time thinking about the meaning of life because they are near-
ing the end of their lives, not because they were born at an earlier point in history. If
this is the case, then a life cycle effect may be superimposed on a generational change,
suppressing the age relationship. If so, we would expect the spread of postmaterialist
values to bring a growing tendency for people to spend time thinking about the mean-
ing and purpose of life. This is precisely what we found, as Figure 19 demonstrates.
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Table 4
SEXUAL PERMISSIVENESS
(percent who said “never justified”)
Canada Mexico U.S.
1980 1990 2000 2005 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
Homosexuality 51 37 26 19 72 55 55 50 34 65 54 45 32 33
Prostitution 50 42 46 39 67 49 55 58 42 64 60 58 49 44
Abortion 38 20 31 25 64 39 59 67 55 43 34 36 30 26
Divorce 19 13 11 9 48 26 37 37 26 22 18 12 7 6
Average 39 28 28 23 63 42 51 53 39 49 41 38 29 27
The U.S. did not change between 1980 and 1990, but, in both Canada and Mexico,
we found strong increases in the percentage of the public who “often” think about
the meaning and purpose of life. The trend reached very high levels in 2000 in all
three countries. Mexico moved even higher in 2005, whereas both Canada and the
U.S. receded, probably as an impact of the decrease of postmaterialists linked to
9/11 as hypothesized above.
Religiosity
For most respondents, attitudes toward religion may well be the most central and
important component of their worldview. Whether or not one believes in God is a
powerful predictor of a wide range of other orientations. Religion has remarkably
broad ramifications. 
The most sensitive indicators of this dimension are: 1) whether the respondents
say that God is important in their lives (rated on a 10-point scale); 2) whether or not
they describe themselves as religious; and, 3) whether or not they say they get strength
and comfort from religion. These attitudes are strongly correlated with age. In all three
countries, the young place far less emphasis on religion than do the older respon-
dents. In the U.S. and Canada, the members of the oldest cohort are about twice as
likely as the young to rank high on religiosity. In Mexico, the differences are equal-
ly striking.
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OFTEN THINK ABOUT MEANING OF LIFE 
As Figure 20 illustrates, in all three countries, from 1980 to 1990, religiosity de-
clined but increased again during the next period. The change was slight in the U.S.
but sizeable in both Canada and particularly in Mexico.
Church Attendance
To what extent are attitudes and behavior on the same trajectory? Our 1980 surveys
show that in all three countries, church attendance rates were substantially lower
among the young than among the old. Also, these age differences were paralleled
by consistent differences across value types: postmaterialists attend church less fre-
quently than do materialists.
This finding suggests that we cannot count on a given cohort to become more
faithful in their church attendance as they grow older: the age differences may reflect
different formative experiences which have left the younger generations with a
weaker attachment to religion. Our 1980 data predicted declines in church atten-
dance for that decade. As Figure 21 demonstrates, we find confirming evidence in
all three countries for the entire 1980–2005 period, with a recovery in Mexico and the
U.S. in 2000. The change was very modest in the United States in the first decade
and would not be worth mentioning if it did not occur in the broader context of
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RELIGIOSITY  
confirming indications that were found there. In both Canada and the U.S., on the
other hand, we find relatively large declines in church attendance since 1990.
Civil Permissiveness
The pattern of changes in levels of civil permissiveness is more ambiguous. It is
measured by asking respondents about avoiding paying public transportation fares,
cheating on taxes, and accepting bribes in the course of their duties. In the United
States and Canada, there is a shift toward greater civil permissiveness from 1980 to
1990. In Mexico, on the other hand, the change is large but it cannot be attributed
to intergenerational population replacement; most of it seems to reflect nation-spe-
cific period effects.
During the late 1980s, there was a sharp decline in trust in government and a
sharp rise of mass politicization in Mexico, apparently coupled with rising opposi-
tion to the PRI’s continued dominance of Mexican politics. In 1995, both the U.S. and
Mexico experienced decreased tolerance for civil permissiveness, the former, slight-
ly, and the latter, dramatically. In 2000, Canada and Mexico moved towards less
civil permissiveness, whereas it increased in the U.S. In 2005, the opposite is found:
Canada and Mexico became more permissive and the U.S., slightly less.
These findings indicate that the shift observed above toward sexual permis-
siveness is not a shift toward permissiveness in general. We are not dealing with a
nihilistic trend toward the feeling that “anything goes,” including theft and bribes.
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CHURCH ATTENDANCE
Instead, the trend toward greater sexual permissiveness reflects increasing accept-
ance of certain specific forms of individual self-expression. They point toward de-
criminalization of what are sometimes referred to as “victimless crimes.” Recent
changes in Mexico seem very distinctive, but both the U.S. and Canada remain non-
permissive when it concerns this cluster of attitudes.
The young are more permissive than the old in all three countries, as was true
with attitudes toward sexual behavior. Furthermore, the postmaterialists tend to
tolerate slightly higher levels of civil permissiveness than do materialists. Here, the
pattern is much less clear cut than it was with sexual permissiveness. 
Canadian postmaterialists rate slightly higher on tolerance of civil permissive-
ness than do the materialists in that country, but the difference is much smaller than
the one linked with sexual permissiveness. In Mexico, the postmaterialists were
actually less permissive than the materialists in 1980, but they caught up with the
general trend in the region during the latter waves. Data on values are not available
for the U.S. in 1980, but, after 1990, data indicate that U.S. postmaterialists and
materialists are nearly equally divided.
Summary Comparison 
What does the addition of new data tell us? First, the analytical framework we used
for the analysis back in 1990 (namely, the materialists–postmaterialist framework)
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CIVIL PERMISSIVENESS (PERCENT WHO SAID “NEVER JUSTIFIED”)
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remains useful as does the new application of the Inglehart’s values map. Second,
the increase of trade, investments, border crossings, communication, tourism, and
labor reinforce mutual trust. Third, the key values reviewed on economic and polit-
ical matters seem to be moving in a much more synchronized way. Our interpreta-
tion is that Mexico used to lag far behind its continental neighbors in economic and
political practices and institutions but is catching up rapidly and entering into the
normal path of modern democratic and economic life.
Fourth, when we come to a more internal and personal realm as family and
personal values are, it is impressive how the three countries’ values also move up
and down very similarly. We interpret this finding as some sort of “fine tuning” that
is operating at the individual level throughout a variety of mechanisms produced
by the enormous amount of interaction in the region, which also reinforce proxim-
ity. Finally, Adams and Huntington’s challenges do not seem to stand. As Table 5
shows, the shift trend between the three countries from 1990 to 2005 converges in
25 out of 54 values (46 percent); diverges in 20 (37 percent); and is parallel in 9 (17
percent). It is a weak convergence, but it is not a divergence. Particularly, findings
between Canada and the U.S. show converging trends in 13 out of 19 value shifts
(68 percent) with 4 divergences and 2 parallel results. On the other hand, Canada and
Mexico converge in 5 trends, diverge in 7, and are parallel in 4, whereas the U.S.
and Mexico converge in 7, diverge in 9, and are parallel in 3. 
The average distance shown at the bottom row of Table 5 confirms the weak
convergence. While the 1990 distances between the countries averaged 5.9 (590 per-
cent), by 2005, it is slightly reduced to 5.3 (530 percent). The trajectory is weak but
maintains the trend that was observed in 1990. 
CONCLUSIONS
Adams’s claim of divergence may reflect a selection of values. But that is not the
overall picture, as the WVS data shows. Huntington’s image that the deepening of
NAFTA will lead to massive Hispanic immigration into the United States and, ulti-
mately, that the English-speaking culture and, perhaps, even the democratic politi-
cal institutions of the United States will be swept away by a Hispanic flood seems
unrealistic. Comparisons between the values of two or three countries inevitably
draw attention to differences. Placing value change in a broader perspective, as we
show in the World Values map (Figure 2), provides a useful corrective. Those data
clearly show that the value shift on these basic dimensions in the U.S., Canada, and
Mexico are moving along the same trajectories. In the long run, a deepening of the
NAFTA relationship would almost certainly result in less Mexican immigration to the
U.S., as was the case for Spain after joining the European Union (Royo, 2003: 305-309).
The experience of the European Community seems instructive for North Amer-
ica. A half-century has passed since the Treaty of Rome established the European
Common Market. At that time, it was still taken for granted that the Germans and
French were hereditary enemies who naturally hated each other and were doomed
to fight a major war every few decades. After more than five decades of working
together, these feelings of antagonism have gradually disappeared. Today, opinion
surveys indicate that the French public views the Germans as their closest ally and
most trusted partners; German attitudes toward France are almost equally positive
(Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2007). This is an immensely important change in the
political landscape of Europe, though one which has largely escaped attention
because it has taken place so gradually.
As we have seen, one of the major sources of opposition to the economic inte-
gration of North America is grounded in the fear that integration would erode the
distinctive cultures of neighboring countries. This fear is not wholly unfounded:
there is evidence that, in many respects, the basic values of Canadians, Mexicans, and
Americans have been gradually converging. But these changes were taking place
even before the free trade agreements and would probably continue in any event.
One should not underestimate the degree to which different peoples can live under
common economic and political institutions and still retain a high degree of cultur-
al diversity. Some convergence will almost inevitably take place between the three
countries regardless of whether formal integration takes place. The fear that all
three publics will become one dull, homogeneous mass, however, seems unrealistic.
As other analysts in each of these three countries have repeatedly shown, vari-
ations in regional cultures within each of these countries have remained remark-
ably robust and resistant to homogenization. Francophone Québécois, for example,
have retained vibrant and distinctive cultural outlooks after more than a century of
co-existence with their Anglophone counterparts. Furthermore, they have managed
to maintain this cultural co-existence within the same broad institutional structures
(Gagnon and Iacovino, 2006: 114-121).
Whether one is afraid of change or is eager for it, all three North American
countries are inevitably experiencing that change. Technological and economic
developments will continue to reshape these societies. The question is not whether
one accepts change or excludes it; the question is how societies adapt to it. On the
whole, strengthening a North American free trade area and deepening ties seems
likely to give the peoples of these countries more control over their destiny and
more resources to help cope with change than they would have otherwise.
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